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An important factor in assessing federal procurement policy reform is understanding the
environment in which these reforms must be implemented. This paper will describe the
Department of Detense (DOD) environment by tracing the history of DOD procurement reforms.
After describing this evolution, patterns from past reforms and their implications for the future
will be discussed.
Procurement policy involves several elements. At one extreme are the detailed procurement
regulations embodied in the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) and in the various Service
directives and instructions. At the other extreme are the global policy issues, such as military
strategy and the perceived threat, that indirectly influence the procurement enviro:iment. The
middle ground includes general procurement procedures and guidelines. This paper will focus on
the middle ground, including the shortcomings of the process as perceived by the participants and
the reforms recommended to correct these shortcomings.
The starting point for this analysis is the late 1940s. Dissatisfaction with defense
procurement undoubtedly existed before this time. However, the late 1940s is a logical starting
point. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and DOD were both formed in the late 1940s, to
integrate and coordinate the Services. Defense procurement was one important aspect of DOD's
responsibilities. In addition, thee wasn't really a defense industry before the late 1940s.
Weapons procurement did not require long lead times and there was no imminent threat to the U.S.
homeland. Therefore, the U.S. had sufficient time to convert commercial manufacturing facilities to
military production when needed. When, the U.S. became the first line of defense in Europe, and
weapon technologies became increasingly complex and distinct from commercial technologies, the
U.S. began developing a defense-related industrial capability.
Considering this background, this study will describe the history of DOD procurement
reforms from the late 1940s to the present. More specifically, procurement reforms will be
grouped into several eras: early DOD (1947-1960), McNamara (1961-1969), Packard
(1969-1972), OMB Circular A-109 (1976), Carlucci (1980-1983), Congressional initiatives
(1983-1985), and the Packard Commission (1986). In each era, the discussion will consider the
perceived problems, perceived causes, symptoms, recommendations, ard actions. After examining
these reforms, recurring patterns observed in past reforms will be discussed.
This paper was originally prepared for the TIMS/ORSA joint national meeting, Economics of
Defense Procurement Session, NWýw Orleans, May 4-6, 1987. It draws heavily on, "History of DOD
Procurement Reform Efforts," by William Gates and James R. Vernon, prepared for the Second
Conference on Issues in the Economics of Defense Procurement, the RAND Corporation, Santa
Monica, CA, February 9-10, 1987. I would like to thank Katchan Terasawa (RAND Corp.) for his
insights and guidance throughout this effort. I would also like to thank the anonymous refrees for
their valuable suggestions. Any remaining misinterpretations, errors, or omissions are the
author's responsibility.
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. The ideas expressed in this paper are the author's and
do not necessarily represent the views of the Naval Postgraduate School or 'he Department of the
Navy.
PROCUREMENT REFORM HISTORY
E, ary COD1
During the period before OSD and DOD were formed, it was generally agreed that coordination
in the defense sector was becoming increasingly important. Changes in the weapons technology
blurred the traditional distinctions between the Services (e.g., is an interci)ntinental ballistic
missile (ICBM) an unmanned aircraft, or a long range artillery system?); changes in military
strategy increased the importance of iotegrating the Services; changes in the military environment
added to the variety of conflicts the U.S. had to be prepared to fight.
There were several symptoms indicating that the procurement process was not well
coordinated. Ambiguities between Service missions and attempts by the Services to expand their
roles led to interservice competition and overlapping weapons programs in some areas (e.g.,
ICBMs). In other areas, there were imbalances and inconsistencies in the Services' strategies,
capabilities, and requirements (e.g., the Air Force was preparing for short-duration full-scale
nuclear exchanges while the Army was preparing for drawn out conventional conflicts).
In part, these overlaps and inconsistencies persisted because each Service established its own
military requirements and received its procurement appropriations directly from Congress. There
was no OSD or DOD to help coordinate these requirements. These inconsistencies were compounded
because the budget planning horizon was only one year (out-year budget requirements were not
considered). Therefore, many hardware development projects were approved with no insight into
later year budget implications. Programs had to be canceled or delayed as later budgets were
insufficient to support the programs as planned.
The Administration's ability to coordinate the defense sector was also limited. The Services
established their requirements independently of a military budget constraint. At the same time, the
Administration determined the military budget independently of hardware requirements. There was
no central mechanism to resolve discrepancies between requirements and the budget. This lead to
gaps between programs and imbalances within programs. Furthermore, the budget was the
Administration's only tool to influence the Services' weapons portfolio. This led to gaming behavior
(and allegedly some inefficient decisions) as the Services' tried to increase their budgets and the
President tried to influence the Services.
The response to these problems was to create a centralized defense authority, limit the
Services' power, and make both the Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) more responsive to
an overall DOD perspective. The organizational remedies were embodied in several initiatives: the
National Security Act of 1947 created the National Security Council and the Office of the Secretary
of Defense (initially not a cabinet-level position;ý the National Security Reorganization Act of
1949 made DOD an Executive Department and down graded the Military Departments;
Reorganization Plan No. 6 (1953) expanded OSD's staff and authority; and, the Reorganization Act
of 1958 gave the Secretary of Defense power to reorganize DOD and established the Unified and
Specified commands by law (removing the Military Departments from the chain of command over
the operating forces).
With regard to procurement regulations, Th2 Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947 was
the first formal unified defense procurement policy. This Act specified that whenever appropriate,
the Services should advertise requirements to competing suppliers (e.g., items that are
commercially available from multiple suppliers). When advertising was inappropriate (e.g.,
complex systems
1For a discussion of this period see References 1, 11, 18, 34. 36, 37, 43.
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development projects), the Services were exempt from the requirements of the Act. In the late
1050s, risky and expensive weapcn system development programs, particularly ballistic missiles,
became increasingly prevalent. The increasing cost and technical uncertainty in these programs
raised the government's concern over the contractors' performance. The government began
monitoring the contractors' actions and attempting to influence their behavior through contract
incentives. Formal advertising was inappropriate in these programs, so the Air Force issued a
series of directives outlining an alternative policy. These directives, referred to as the 375
Series, laid the foundation for the systems approach promoted later by McNamara.
The McNamara Era 2
When McNamara became SECDEF in. 1961, the same problems continued to plague the defense
sector. McNamara believed that implementation had been the primary shortcoming of the earlier
reforms The SECDEF had been given sufficient power and legal authority to provide central
guidance, but not the staff and management tools required to actively exercise this authority.
McNamara characterized his management philosophy as a decision pyramid. The aim was to
push all decisions to the lowest appropriate level. The top levels simply provided a framework to
ensure ',hat decisions were consistent with one another. Applying this philosophy to DOD
procurement, McNamara felt that the Services shou!d develop the alternatives to be considered: OSD
should make the choices between alternaties. To implement this approach, OSD needed mechanisms
to force alternatives to the surface, procedures to analyze them, and staff to conduct the analyses
and make the decisions.
McNamara initiated a series of reforms to implement his management philosophy. To provide
the required management tools, McNamara introduced the Programming-Planning.Budgeting
System (PPBS), the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP), and the Program Change Control System. The
PPBS was designed to integrate the budget, requirements, and strategy in the annual program
submissions formulated by the Services and OSD; the FYDP projected the implications of today's
decisions on future defense budgets; and the Program Change Control System ensured that the FYDP
reflected the latest decisions. In addition, McNamara established the Systems Analysis Office to
provide the staff and analytical procedures required by the PPBS. The Joint Strategic Objectives
Plan (JSCP), written annually by the JCS and Service Chiefs, served as McNamara's military
strategy statement. Finally, McNamara established mission oriented budgets to provice better
visibility into their relative priorities that the Services attached to the various military missions.
As the 1960s progressed, quantitative measures of program performance became increasingly
important. These quantitative measures indicated that cost growth was becoming more significant.
Therefore, McNamara introduced several initiatives to reduce costs and control cost growth. He
introduced a program cefinition phase at the beginning of every program both to filter out
ill-advised programs and provide better estimates of the required cost and time. He also encouraged
value engineering and established a cost reduction program. The cost reduction program emphasized
contractor competition and was expected to reduce costs by 25%. Because ot seemingly excessive
cost growth in cost-plus contracts, McNamara also emphasized incentive contracts and total package
procurement. Finally, to enhance DOD's ability to monitor the contractors and Services, McNamara
increased data repoiling requirements and introduced shoula-cost analysis (a DOD r jst analysis to
determine how much a program "should" cost). Finally, the Selected Acquisition Reporling System
(SAR) was introduced in 1968. The SARs summarize col.I, schedule, and performance data on
major acquisition programs. This was originally consic.ered an internal management tool.
However, the SARs also became the formal quarterly program report to Congress. Thus, they serve
a dual role.
2 For a discussion cf this period see References 1, 12, 17, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26.
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During the 1960s, there was growqg dissatisfaction with McNamora's approach to Defense
management. The management philosophy was not the point of contention. In fact, most
procurement reforms since McNamara have adopted a similar management philosophy. rhe
coniroversy over McNamara's defense management centered on implementation. McNamara was
criticized for excessive centralization, over-zealous implementation, over-reliance on quantitative
measures, and inadequate recognition of asymmetric information.
Critics felt that most decisions were made at the top levels of OSD; by McNamara in
particular. Furthermore, they felt that the decisions were based largely on quantitative measures
developed by the Systems Analysis Offic• and did not reflect the Services' subjective opinions and
expertise. The Systems Analysis Office was also criticized for taking too active a role in the
decision-making process. The Office was not limited to performing analyses, it also initiated
studies and made recommendations. Finally, the quantitative measures used to compare alternative
programs were criticized because they essentially treated uncertainty ac if it could be predicted.
costed, and managed. Ever since McNamara, DOD procurement reforms have emphasized
decentralization However, the emphasis placed on quartitative measures of program outcomes has
not diminished.
The Packard Era 3
When SECDEF Melvin Laird and DEPSECDEF David Packard took office in 1969, the generally
acknowledged problems in the Defense sector included: excessive centralization; alleged
inefficiencies in the acquisition process ti.e., cost growth); and a separation between decision
making authority, responsibility for implementation, and accountability for the resulting outcome.
The resulting symptoms included cost growth, schedule delays, and technical performance
shortfalls; poorly defined programs; and increasing mistrust between DOD and the contractors.
Excessive competition was one of the most frequently cited cause for these problems. This
included competition between contractors, between the Services, between the various federal
d&pqrtments, and between defense and other national priorities. Competition was seen as driving
contractors to make optimistic projections regarding program costs, schedules, and technical
performance. Neither the Services nor DOD challenged these claims because of interservice and
interdepartmental competition for federal funds. Other contributing factors included
under-qualified program managers, program turbulence, and inadequate testing and evaluation
(which enabled programs to advance before technical uncerlainties had been adequately resolved).
Laird and Packard felt the increased data requiremen's and management oversight introduced
by McNamara had not resolved the earlier problems or their symptoms. It had simply increased
management layering, mace the acquisition process more complex, and separated decision making
authorit,, responsibility, and accountability. Laird and Packard felt the appropriate response was
to decentralize and streamline the acquisition process, increase program manager quality
(inc~uding training, promotion opportunity, and tenure as program manager), improve the
requirements setting process (to ensure that programs would be better defined), increase hardware
testing (emphasizing prototypes whenever possible), and improve cost estimating procedures.
The Packard initiatives were designed to implement this response. These initiatives
emphasized three basic areas: improving DOD's ability to monitor both the contractors and
program managers; improving program managcer quality, and improving the acquisition process
and the quality of the programs tnemselves. These initiatives were embodied in ten major policy
elements, first outlined by Mr. Packard in a series of memorandums and speeches (e.g., Packard
memorandum of 28 May 1,970, "Policy Guidance on Major Weapon System Acquisition"). The
polic, elements include:
3 For a discussion of this time period see References 1, 6, 7. 8, 10. 19, 20, 22. 28, 47.
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I . Provide for systematic proqram reviews by OSD officials at important program milestones
(resu!ted in th, IDSARC. Dcfenso Systems Acquisition Reiiew Council).
2. Provideý CSD with independent cost estimates and improve cost estimate quality by establishing a
Cost Analysis Improvement Gcoup (CAIG) within OSD.
3. Establish cost as a program objective, equal to schedule and performance in importance, and
consider operations and support costs during the development process (design to cost and
life-cycle costing).
4. Increase testing objectivity by establishing operational test and evaluation (OT&E) agencies that
are independent of the Service commands responsible for the development effort.
5. Establish military training courses and schools to improve the program managers' training.
6. Give program managers a clear written charter to strengthen their authority.
7. Provide better promotion opportunities to attract superior officers to program management.
8. Reduce the turnover rate of program managers so that they have longer job tenure.
9. Resolve technological uncertainties during development, not during production (e.g., increase
prototyping, emphasize early and more complete hardware testing, and reduce concurrency).
1 0. Eicourage competitive hardware developments to reduce risk and stimulate contractor efforts.
The Packard initiatives had several characteristics in common with some of the later
McNamara reforms and reforms initiated after Packard. They explicitly cited quantitative
measures of program outcomes iincluding cost growth and to a lesser extent schedule delays and
performance shortfalls) as evidence of acquisition inefficiencies, and they addressed these
inefficiencies by attempting to both increase DOD's monitoring capability and improve program
manager quality. The Packard initiatives also emphasized decentralization and streamlining the
acquisition process. This is contrary to the preceding reforms but has been ':echoed in the succeeding
reforms.
OMI Circular A-109 4
During the mid-1970s, there was increasing concern that the acquisition inefficiencies
observed in DOD (e.g., cost growth, etc.) were common to all federal agencies. There was also
increasing concern that program definition and need justification were inadequate. This resulted in
ill-advised program starts leading to wasteful cancellaticns later in the development process.
To remedy these deficiencies, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) was
established in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). OFPP was chartered to develop an
integrated national procurement policy (embodied in OMB Circular A-109). OMB A-109
essentially applied DOD's procurement policies to all federal agencies (in particular DOD Directive
5000.1). In addition, it added a new milestone to the front-end of the acquisition process. This
milestone addressed the need for a development effort and required the sponsoring agency to
consider all viable alternatives. A development project was justified if the item was necessary and
an alternative solution could not be found.
4 For a further discussion of this tne period see References 1, 2. 3, 7, 8, 19, 28, 51.
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These actions had several impacts on DOD's acquisition process. OFPP represented a new
federal agency with responsibility for DOD procurement policy, and OMB A-109 added another
milestone to the acquisition process. These impacts seem counter to the earlier recommendations to
reduce management layering, streamline the acquisition process, and balance responsibility,
authority, and accountability. OMB A-109 also extended concern for quantitative measures of
acquisition "inefficiencies" to other federal agencies. This indirectly reinforced DOD's increasing
emphasis on these quantitative measures.
The Carlucci Era 5
When Frank Carlucci became DEPSECDEF in 1980, alleged acquisition inefficiencies (cost
growth, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls) continued to plague the defense acquisition
process. There was also concern over the growing federal acquisition bureaucracy and increasing
pressure to reduce the defense budget. In addition, inadequate provisions for the operational phase
of a weapon system's life-cycle (e.g., support and readiness) emerged as an important problem.
To formulate a response, Carlucci established the Steering Group on Improving the Defense
Acquisition System and Reducing System Costs. The Steering group identified concerns of six major
constituencies: Congress/GAO were concerned about cost growth, schedule delays, and performance
shortfalls: the Services were concerned about excessive management oversight by OSD and
Congress: the program managers were concerned about excessive regulation and unrealistic
demands; OSD was concerned about inadequate program planning, funding instability, and long
acquisition periods; OMB/OFPP were concerned about inadequate program definition and
justification, overly detailed specifications, and long acquisition periods; and industry was
concerned about discouragement of capital investment, excessive regulation, overemphasis on price
competition, and adversarial attitudes between DOD and the contractors.
To address these concerns, Carlucci established 31 initiatives. These initiatives can be
roughly grouped into five categories: improve general management principles, increase program
stability, improve forecasting and information, improve support and readiness, and reduce
bureaucracy. Congress later .added a thirty-second initiative calling for increased competition.
Carlucci supported this initiative but had felt that it was implied in the other initiatives.
In developing these initiatives, Carlucci did not specifically distinguish between perceived
problems, p.ýrceived causes, and symptoms (therefore, that distinction is not made here). Carlucci
seemingly had preconceived ideas atout the major problems and appropriate solutions. He jumped
directly to recommendations without relating problems and solutions. This makes it difficult to
determine if the Carlucci initiatives were appropriate for the perceived problems and causes.
The Carlucci initiatives emphasized several improvements suggested in earlier reforms,
including: decentralization, improved federal management capabilities, and increased oversight.
Carlucci also emphasized program stability which had not receivw d much attention earlier.
Congressiolal Initiativ 6
Based largely on the findings of the Presicents Private Sector Survey on Cost Control (the
Grace Commission) and of House and Senate hearings, Congress legislated several procurement
reforms in the mid-1980s. The motivation was the high defense procurement budgjet and the well
publicized "overpriced" spare parts. According to Congress, these problems were caused by lack of
competition, poorly specified needs and plans, inadequate testing, and unethical business practices.
Symptoms included the familiar acquisition "inefficiencies" and a growing defense budget.
5 For a further discussion of this time period see References 9, 39, 40, 46. 48. 49, 50
6 For a further discussion of this time period see References 16, 41, 42. 44 , 45, 52.
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In general, Congress' resolution for these problems was legislation to :ncrease Congress''inpul
into the Federal acquisition process. For example, two of the more significant pieces of legislation
were the Competition in Contracting Act and the Truth in Negotiations Act, The Competition in
Contracting Act overhauled the procurement process to encourage increased competition. The Truth
in Negotiations Act increased the Federal Government's ability to recapture perceived overcharges
by the contractors. One of the most significant aspects of the Congressional initiatives is that they
indicated Congress' intention to become a more active participant in the procurement process.
The Packard Commission 7
The President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (the Packard Commission)
represents a more recent effort to stimulate procurement reform, The Packard Commission
considered Defense management in general, and the acquisition process in particular. The
Commizsion felt that the primary problems with overall defense management wert instability and
poor planning. The primary problems in the acquisition process were the familiar acquisition
"inefficiencies" and overpriced spare parts. Thus, acquisition inefficiencies had been elevated from
symptoms to perceived problems (symptoms and problems were not differentiated). The perceived
causes of these problems included: the long duration of the acquisition process, program
instabilities, gold plating, and program "buy-ins."
The Packard Commission offered several recommendations to alleviate these problems. They
included streamlining the acquisition process (to decentralize procurement management and balance
responsibility, authority, and accountability), increasing tests and prototyping, improving
planning, and adopting the competitive firm model where appropriate. In addition, the Packard
Commission suggested some budgeting innovations (stabilize programs by providing multi-year
funding and authorizations). With the exception of the budgeting initiatives, the President endorsed
the Packard Commission's recommendations in the National Security Decision Directive 219 (April
1986), and they were incorporated in the Defense Reorganization Act.
Past exprience gives reason to be pessimistic about the expected improvements from the
Packard Commission's recommendations (and this is supported by the DOD procurement scandal in
June 1988). The problems and reforms identified by the Packard Commission are similar to the
problems and reforms identified previously. The earlier reforms were not successful. There are
no distinguishing characteristics suggesting these recommendations will be any different.
Summary. of Procurement Reform Hi..tc.
For reference, the perceived problems, perceived causes, symptoms, recommendations,
actions, and comments for each of the reform efforts are summarized in Table 1.
RECURRING PATTERNS AND THEMES IN PAST D PROCUREMENT REFORM EFFORTS
After examining the past DOD procurement reform efforts, at least two recurring themes
become evident. There has been an increasing emphasis on quantitative measures of program
performance. Cost growtri, schedule delays, and technical performance shortfalls have been
elevated from proxies to direct measures of program inefficiencies, and procurement reforms have
focused on alleviating these symptoms rather than addressing the underlying problems. In addition,
the number of players and viewpoints concerned with the federal acquisition process has increased,
diffusing authority and accountability. This has persisted despite repeated recommendations to
decentralize 1he procurement process and increase the responsibility, authority, and accountability
of those most directly involved in the procurement process (e.g., the program manager). Both of
these themes will be discussed briefly.
7 For a further discussion of this tlime period see References 29, 30. 31, 32
~.2
C E 0 -
0 o ~0
0C3  0
- n a. (
:~'-U ~ 3  ~ 3o 00 W >
*0 0' o~~30 ~S -~ ~ 0.o
o s *c z Q0Z s0 C0ou) c 9
L- Q.- 0 c,* > C'00
((9 0(<. E9 0
0 ~ c (9(9 o m ~
- c-- 0> o 1 CC W
A (-A-' < gC ~2 c so 3 oOr0
uO (9, V) I 0 '-001
000 0 M(.- -' 0
5 COOu 0-0 m 0o
a.0
0 ~~ ~ w)-- <3
S0 '-0 000o3 0
'WV0 0 0
(9 0 -n 0 (
u -z
v) 'oo- Y c
Fix thp Problems. Not the Symptoms
Because DOD's procurement budget is so large, it is natural to question whether the funds are
being used efficiently. A small inefficiency in DOD's procurement process could translate into a
substantial waste of funds in absolute terms. Analysts would like an index that measures whether
DOD's funds are being used efficiently. Unfortunately, there aren't any indices that directly
measure p-ocurement inefficiencies. This forces analysts to use quantitative measures of program
outcomes as proxies for inefficiency. Cost growth has received the greatest emphasis, but schedule
delays, technical performance shortfalls, and more recently high unit procurement costs and
program turbulence, have also received attention. Discussions regarding inefficiencies in DOD's
procurement process cente, on these quantifiable outcomes. Over time, the proxies have come to b.
viewed as program inefficiencies, and refoms have addressed these measures rather than the
underlying causes.
It is important to remember that tnese factors are only proxies, they are not inefficiencies.
Furthermore, they may not ble good proxies. Cost growlh is not necessarily inefficient if the weapon
program is conducted efficiently but !he initial cost estimate was low. Similarly, the absence of
cost growth does not indicate efficiency if the initial cost estimate was excessive.
Focusir . too much attention on these proxies can be counterproductive. Program data are
ambiguous, difficult to interpret, and frequently misleading. As a result, it is difficult to determine
if program inefficiencies are significant. Proxies ca~i indicate that there is a problem when none
exists, or vice versa. Because of the difficulties in interpreting the data, procurement reforms
frequently focus on the proxy rather than the underlying causes of inefficiency. If the underlying
problems are not corrected, the program inefficiencies will persist as well. Two alleged
inefficiencies, cost growth and program turbulence, both addressed by recent procurement
reforms, illustrate the difficulty of identify'rng inefficiencies, auses, and the appropriate solutions.
Cost Growth. Consider cost data from five major weapon system acquisition programs (Table
2). This data indicates that all programs experienced cost growth in real unit procurement costs.
(This discussion assumes that-the data has been properly corrected for inflation and changes in
procurement quantities. While there is reason to question this assumption, measurement problems
are beyond the scope of this analysis. Changes in the absolute values of program cost growth would
not affect the discussion presented here.) There are several alternative ways to interpret this data.
Formulating the appropriate response depends on identifying the correct interpretation.
TABLE 2
REAL UNFT PROCUREMENT COST GROWTH
WEAPON SYSTEM TIME PERIOD ASE YEAR DOLLARS %UNIT COST GROWTH
BLACKHAWK 12/71 - 9/82 1971 29
MI TANK 9/73 - 12/82 1972 37
BRADLEY 3/73 - 3/83 1972 210
APRACHE 9/73 - 12182 1972 61
PATRIOT 3/72 - 1 Z182 1972 113
Source: William Gates and Joseph L. Midler, Cost Growth in Maior Army Weapon System
Acuisi ;L--A Synthesis of Five Case Studies. AC-RR-85-004, Pasadena: Arroyo Center, Jet
Propulsirn I nboratory, California Instit,.te of Technclogy, January 1985. (Reference 15)
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Cost growth could result from mismanagement and fraud. This is consistent with the view that
cost growth is a direct indication of program inefficiencies. In this case, the appropriate response
is to improve DOD's cost management capabilities. As emphasized in recent reforms, this involves
improving cost data, cost estimating techniques, and the qualifications of DOD's program managers.
These reforms might be successful if cost growth results from mismanagement and fraud. However,
such reforms will not be successful if cost growth is merely a signal of other problems.
An alternative explanation for cost growth has been referred to as the "winners curse. 9s
Development and procurement costs are uncertain at the beginning of an acquisition program. In
the selection process, potential contractors are asked to estimate their expected costs. These cost
estimates are used as one factor in the selection process. Other factors being equal, the winning
contractor will be the contractor that underestimates costs by the largest margin (in this case,
cost underestimation is entirely inadvertent, arising from cost uncertainty). This introduces a
selection bias toward Drograms with a predisposition for cost growth, even though the program may
be conducted efficiently. In this case, cost growth is not inefficient. However, cost growth may be a
signal that there are inefficiencies in the selection process. Furthermore, measures to improve
DOD's cost management capabilities will neither reduce the level of cost growth nor eliminate the
underlying inefficiency.
A third explanation for cost growth considers the impact of competition. Competitive
pressures during the proposal process encourage contractors to flake optimistic initial cost
estimates (this is intentional rather than inadvertent cost underestimation). The Services and OSD
have little incentive to challenge these estimates because they want Congress tu 'und the weapon
system. Optimistic initial cost estimates increase the likelihood of cost growth later in the program
when competition is eliminated. This is illustrated by the data for the five weapon systems
considered above. Figure 1 shows real unit procurement cost growth in these programs as a
function of the years from the production contract award. Cost estimates were relatively stable
during development. When the weapon systems entered production, essentially eliminating
potential competition, unit production costs increased dramatically. This pattern is consistent
across four of the five weapon systems. The Blackhawk is the one exception. In this program, the
contractor signed a series of annual contracts at the end of the competitive development effort.
Therefore, the lack of competition was not felt until after the system entered production. This is
when unit procurement costs began increasing in the Blackhawk program. The problems signaled
by cost growth, the impacts on procurement efficiency, and the appropriate solutions are different
in this instance than in either of the preceding cases.
Thus, there are several plausible explanations for cost growth. Before recommending
procurement reforms it is important to establish that cost growth signals program inefficiencies
(i.e., the proxies are good proxies), and then link the causes and solutions. Reforms will not be
effective if they address the wrong causes. Recent procurement reforms imply that cost growth is
caused by mismanagement and fraud. The proposed solutions involve improving DOD's cost
management capabilities. These reforms will not reduce cost growth if it is caused by selection
biases, over-optimistic projections or some other factor.
Proaram Turbulence. Program turbulence provides another example of the difficulty in
identifying program inefficiencies and their causes. In general, program turbulence is thought io
incrPase unit procurement costs. Changes in production schedules affect the timing of materials and
component purchases. Production variances also affect overhead rates, learning economies, and
scale economies. Both Carlucci and the Packard Commission felt program turbulence contributed to
cost growth and other proxies for procurement inefficiencies. Both proposed initiat'ves to help
stabilize production schedules (e.g., multi-year procurement, funding, and authorizations).
8 For further discussion, see Quirk and Terasawa (Reference 33).
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However, the case Ftudies cited above (Reference 15) indicate that production schedule
changes are caused by funding shortfalls (due to unanticipated inflation and increases in the
contractors' unit cost estimates), unexpected technical problems, changes in the total procurement
objective, and program funding changes. In other words, program turbulence is a symptom of
several possible problems, not a cause of cost growth. In fact, program turbulence may be an
efficient response to unavoidable and unpredictable changes in national priorities, the defense
environment, or the program itself. If this is the case, efforts to stabilize high priority programs
simply shift the burden of adjustment to unprotected programs. The cost of added turbulence in
unprotected programs should be considered in deciding whether to stabilize high priority programs.
In addition, turbulence may affect program costs in ways not captured in observable data.
Contractors understand that production rates in federal procurement projects change unexpectedly
for unavoidable reasons. Therefore, they expect turbulence. Anticipated turbulence gives
contractors an incentive to install flexible production facilities. Flexible production facilities are
typically labor (variable input) intensive and have comparatively stable unit costs over a
relatively wide range of production rates. The penalty for using flexible production facilities is
higher unit production costs at the planned production rate. On the other hand, unit costs in flexible
productior facilities are lower if the actual production rates deviates significantly from the planned
capacity. Observable program data does not capture the cost implications of selecting flexible
production processes. Unit production costs will be higher if production rates remain at or near
their planned levels; they will be lower if production turbulence is significant. Because these cost
implications cannot be observed, it is impossible to determine if the cost of expected turbulence
exceeds the benefit, or vice versa.
FIGURE 1
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Source: William Gates and Joseph L. Midler, Cost Growth in Maior Army Weapon System
Acquisitions: A Synthesis of Five -Case -Studies. AC-RR-85-004, Pasadena: Arroyo Center, Jet
Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, January 1985. (Reference 15)
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If I jm Accountable. IWant thLe ResDonsibilijly and Authority
Decentralizing decisions to the appropriate level and balancing responsibility, authority, and
accountability are themes that have recurred throuohout most procurement reforms. The
management philosophies underlying all reform proposals, including McNamara's, have stressed
that authority and responsibility for general policy issues should be centralized while authority and
responsibility for implementing these policies should be decentralized to the greatest extent
possible. Centralizing general policy issues helps coordinate DOD's procurement process and avoids
unnecessary waste and duplication. Decentralizing authority and responsibility helps ensura
adequate flexibility to respond to changes in technology and the military environment. Finally,
balancing responsibility, authority, and accountability at all levels of the procurement process
helps promote efficiency. Presumably, inefficiencies are more likely when tnu: responsible
managers lack the required authority and cannot be held accountable for the results of their
decisions.
Reforms trnrcugh the early McNamara initiatives were designed to increase (3ordination by
centralizing decisions. Reforms since then have stressed decentralization to increase flexibility,
free the procurement process from instituticnal burdens (red tape), and promote the proper
balance between r.,sponsibility, authority, and accountability. Despite the agreement, in principal,
on the proper balance between centralization and decentralization, the continuing emphasis on
decentralizing authority and increasing accountability indicates that the proper balance has not
been achieved. Responsibility has been decentralized, but not authority and accountability.
In fact, structural changes in the defense sector have continuously centralized authority and
diluted accountability. Since 1961, OSD has expanded from eight Assistant Secretaries arid 2
Defense Agencies to 2 Under Secretaries, 12 Assistant Secretaries, arid 12 Defense Agencies. In
addition, OSD has advocates responsible for protecting the interests of several specific constituents
(e.g., small and disadvantaged businesses). In the Executive Branch, OFPP was given responsibility
for establishing a federal procurement policy in 1976. Within Congress, the number of
committees and subcommittees overseeing DOD procurement policies has increased from 26 in
1970 to 96 in 1985 (Ref. 13, page 75). Similarly, the number of studies Congress has requested
from DOD has increased by a factor of six (Table 3). Table 4 summarizes the various organizations
concerned with the federal procurement process, and their respectlve responsibil:ties.
IABLE 3
CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTIONS TO DOD AND PAGES IN BUDGET JUSTIFICATIQN BOOK
.Reuired byCommitteeR ReoRequired by Law Paes in Budget Justification Book
Studies Other Actions
1976 1 14 208 96 12,350
1977 129 184 .37
1978 153 229 101 15,815
1979 177 213 109
1980 231 166 125 17,457
1981 223 180 138
1982 221 210 158 21,143
1983 325 120 183 21,753
1984 422 202 21 7 25,306
1985 458 113 213 26,757
1986 676 134 227
Source: U.S., General Accounting Office, Legislative Oversight: C)naressional Requests for
Information on Defense Activities. NSIAD-86-65BR, February 1986. (Reference 52)
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While all participants are dedicated to the success of a program, diffP'rent organizations have
different objectives so success has several meanings. The President (as represented by OMB) and
members of Congress must balance defense expenditures, macroeconomic considerations (e.g.,
inflation, unemployment, the budget deficit, etc.), and other national priorities (e.g., social
programs, etc.). In addition, elected officials presumably have to consider reelection (either for
the candidates personally or for their party). OSD has at least two objectives: providing an
adequate national defense and minimizing discontent in the defense sector. The larger the defense
budget, the easier it is to accomplish both objectives. The Services have the same concerns as OSD,
but their viewpoint and loyalties are limited to their particular Service. Program managers are
sensitive to the Service's objectives because their career advancement depends on the Service's
evaluation of their performance. At the same time, program managers cannot be insensitive to the
contractors because of concern for their future employment prospects. Contractors are motivated
by profits. However, defense contractors probably consider long-term profits. They typically
have on-going relationships with DOD. Therefore, they may be reluctant to exploit short-run
profit opportunities if it would jeopardize their long-term relationship with DOD.
TABLE 4
FEDERAL ORGAN17,.TIONS CONCERNED WITH DEPARTM OSE PROCUREMENT POLICY
ORGANIZATION RESPONS!BILITIES
Congress Nigotiate the Overall Defense Budget
Oversee Federal Procurement Po'icies and Regulations
Establish Agency Missions (OFPP, Services. Etc.)
Authorize Programs and Appropriate Funds
Oversee Program Management (Ccmmittee Hearings, Staff Reports, GAO)
OMB Negotiate the Overall Defense Budget
OFPP (CMB) Establish Federal Procurement Policies and Regulations (Issue the FAR, Policy
Letters, and Directives)
Train the Federal Procurement Work Force (Federal Acquisition Institute)
Collect Federal Procurement Data (Federal Procurement Data Center)
Federal Agencies Protect Special Interests (Department of Labor, Small Business Administration)
Negotiate the Overall Defense Budget
Finalize Defense Program Priorities
Establish DOD Procurement Policies and Regulations to Implement the Federal
Guidelines (Issue DOD Directives and Instructions)
Oversee Program Management (DSARC, Defense Contract Audit Agency, Etc.)
Carry Out Certain Activities Common to More Than One Service (Defense Agencies)
Services Negotiate Service Budget
Establish Service Program Priorities
Establish Service Procurement Policies and Regulations to Implement the Federal
and DOD Guidelines (Issue Service Directives, Regulations, and Instructions)
Perform Program Management
Field Completed Weapon Systems
Provide Data Supporting Project Selection/Management Oversight Processes
Contractor Execute Procurement Programs
Provide Data to Support the Management and Project Selection Processes
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The large number of cognizant organizations, and the diversity of their interests, diffuses
authority and dilLutes accountability. The program manager, who ultimately could be held
responsible for the outcome of the project, is only one of several participants in the decision
making process Congress, OMB, OFPP, OSD, the Services, and advocates representing various
special interest groups can all constrain the program manager's actions to ensure they satisfy the
voluminous guidelines governing federal procurement. As a result, the program manager has
limited authority and frequently is more concerned with the process than the results. The process
is more directly accountable for the results than the participants.
At the same time, expanding the list of participants makes it more difficult to reform the
procurement process. Organizations with different viewpoints typically perceive different
problems. This was recognized by Verne Orr (former Secretary of the Air Force, Reference 27)
and is illustrated by comparing the perceived problems and reforms recommended by different
organizations (e.g., the differing concerns of the six constituencies identified by Carlucci).
Similarly, different participant make different recommendations for correcting the perceived
problems. Each organization typically believes that procurement problems can best be solved by
increasing their own role. Thus, Congress has become more involved in project selection and
micro-management. OMB/OFPP has established detailed procurement regulations, OSD has
extended the formal review process to cover more of a program's life-cycle, particularly in the
ealier phases, and reviews have become more concerned with detailed management decisions. OSD
has also increased its ability to monitor contractors (e.g., the Cost Analysis Improvement Group and
"should-cost" analysis). Finally, the Services have increased the level of detail specified in the
contract. Even small design changes or changes in technical specifications are subject to Service
review and must be incorporated into the procurement contract.
As the number of organizations increases, their viewpoints and vested interests become more
narrowly defined. Furthermore, each office tends to view its responsibility or function as an end in
itself, rather than a means to an end. Organizations become reluctant to give up responsibility or
authority, and it is harder to obtain general agreement on procurement reform. Thus, the
proliferation of organizations and management layers probably makes effective procurement
reform more difficult.
CNLUSIN
Quantitative measures of procurement "efficiency" have received increasing attention since
the early 1960s. This has generated widespread concern over perceived inefficiencies, including
cost growth, schedule delays, performance shortfalls, and program turbulance. Unfortunately,
these perceived inefficiencies have persisted despite several attempts to reform the procurement
process. In part, past reform failures may have resulted from ambiguities in the program data. It
is difficult to determine if the observed outcomes indicate that inefficiencies are significant, and if
significant, it is difficult to determine the underlying causes. As a result, procurement reform may
address the symptoms of inefficiency rather than the underlying causes.
Frustration over the symptoms' persistence has created a growing sense of mistrust.
Congress mistrusts OSD; OSD mistrusts the Services; and Services mistrust the contractors.
initially, procurement reform tried to minimize the incidence of deception by improving program
manager quality and pooviding better management tools. When these efforts failed, OMB, Congress,
OSD, and the Services began taking more active program management roles. Program evaluations at
all levels examined increasingly detailed management decisions, milestones and documentation
requirements were increased, and independent testing agencies were added to monitor test results.
This has lead to a proliferation of detailed procurement regulations, data requirements, and
management layers, resulting in greater centralization and diluted authority and accountability.
This trend has persisted despite repeated attempts to decentralize the process and balance
responsibility, authority, and accountability.
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It appears that decentralizing the procurement process (including authority) i- impossible as
long as there is a sense of mistrust. Without greater trust, Congress will not compromise their
ability or authority to review the detailed management decisions made by S3D, the Services, and
contractors. The same is true for OSD and the Services. For similar reasons, it is unlikely that
procurement regulations can be reduced or generalized uniil mutual trust increases. As long as
there is fear of deception, procurement reform is likely to follow the pattern of earlier reforms:
increasing micro-management at all levels of the process.
To help solve this problem, it is useful to consider why this fear of deception persists.
Mistrust arises, at least in part, from two related facts of the procurement process: the various
rarticipants have different objectives and possess differont areas -f expertise. For example, the
contractors' primary objectives include maximizing long-term profits and they probably are most
knowledgeable about expected costs, technical complexity, and their level of effort. The Services'
primary objectives include maximizing their budget and the military role of their Service. They
probably have the best information concerning their Service's military requirements and the most
effective means to satisfy those requirements. OSD's objectives include maximizing OSD's budget
and keeping the Services content. 0SD is in the best position to assess overall military
requirements. Finally, Congress is sensitive to their constituents and they are in the best position
to balance defense programs against macroeconomic considerations and other national priorities.
Because different players have different information bases, there is an incentive for each
organization to misrepresent its information and promote its own objectives. Unfortunately, it is
difficult to detect misrepresented or biased information when the players have different areas of
expertise. Furthermore, because organizations have different objectives, actions that promote one
organization's objectives may be to the detriment of the other organizations. As a result, it is
natural for the participants to mistrust each other. The response has been to increase management
oversight, data requirements, and independent verification (e.g., should cost, independent testing,
GAO analyses, etc.). These efforts have increased the procurement bureaucracy, but have not
alleviated the fears of deception. Independent evaluations are imperfect because it is expensive (or
impossible) to obtain independent information. Therefore, analysts typically rely on data provided
by the organization being evaluated. Presumably, this data reflects the organization's biases.
An alternative approach to procurement reform would recognize the sense of mistrust, and its
sources, One way to reduce mistrust is to structure the procurement process so that the players
have common objectives. Specifically, procurement reform should address the incentives facing
each of the constituenLc•. This would require modifying contract incentive structures to influence
the contractors' behavior. It would also require modifying the performance evaluation and i'eward
system for government personnel involved in the procurement process. Modifications in these
areas could help encourage all participants to report information truthfully and work toward
comon objectives. (For some recent developments in this area of research see References 4, 5, and
14.) Mistrust will be lower if the incentive structure ensures that all participants are working
toward common objectives. If procurement reforms continue to increase micro-management
without changing the participants incentives, it is unlikely that future reforms will have any
better success than past reforms.
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deavohpment projects), 11-e Servcet were exempt from the requlrenientoz of the Act. In the late
10950s, r1akv and expensive weapon systemn davelopment programs, particularly' ballistic missiles.
becai'ne increasingly prevalent. The incraasing cost and tprhnlcal uflcertalidty ;n~ these programs
raised the govornment's c~oncerni over the contractors' peirformanicc. The gwernmcent bpgan
inonitoring thic contractors' ar~tions tind attempting to Influence their behavior through contract
incontives. Formal advertising wA!ý Inappropri~ate in these programs, so the Air Force issued a
scrtes of diroctiVes outlininq an alternative policy. These directives, reftrred to as the 375
Sarips. iniid the luunda~ion for the systems approach promnoted later by McNarnara.
A
When McNamara became SECDEF In 1961, the same problems continued to plaguE the defense
spe,,or, McNamar., beii~ved that implernantatlon had been the primery shortcoming of the Parlier
reiorntni. The SECDEF had been given sufficient power anti legal authority to provide central
* guidanr-o, but ri~t the staff and manapjement tool,- required to atictvely 6xercisa t his authority.
McNamara characterized his management philosophy as a decision pyramid. The aim was tu
pvzsh all decizsions to th3 lo,.vest appropriate leval. The top leviiis simply provided a framnework !o
ensure that docisions were consistnnt with one another. Applying this philosophy to DOD
proruremolit., McNamara felt that the Services Should develop the alternatives to be considered: QSD
should make the choices between a.llemetives. To nimplement this approach, OSO needed mechanlisrms
to force aiernaitives to tiue surface. proceduwts lo analyze them, and Staff to conduct the analyses
and makJc !he dec;isiuns.
es cpi- k~f refcitns to Implement his management p.hilosophy. To provide
1'te required management tools, McNamara irntroduced the PrograrnimingjPiannirig.iuijyetlnig
S ýstem (FPBi). ihe. f-i-r Year Defense Plan (FYOP). arnd tho Program Chan~ge Control System- The
Fiss tv~is design-ed to~ Integrat9 the budpei, -equ~erenerits, Pid strateg~y in the annual program
submis-sion!; fonnulated by tha Services and CSr); the FYCP proj3cted the !mpllcations of today'so
d,?cfson!: on future de~'ar~se b".11gets; and the PRogram Change C-mntrol System ensured that the FYD)P
reflficteci the fates' doenis~ori. lIn addliicmn, McNamara established thR. Systemns Analysis Office to
provide the staff and analytical procpdures required' by Via PPBS. Tha Jolrý! Strategic Objectives
Plan "JSO'P). written annually by tho JCS aim Service Chietv. rarved as Mc'ltirara's military
alrstegy stAtipment. Finwily, McNamare *ututbiighed mission oilented budgets toj pi'ovIds better
'.'slb~lity into their ralativ p~iorilles that the Services attached to the various miliftary, miissions.
As :he 119ý3s prog.-assad, quentitatt. u meagures of programn performance became Increasingly
Impcriatit. 1hese qu'antitative measures indicated that cost growdi was becioming more significant.
1herefore, McNamarn introd~uced severazl Initlalivvs to reduce costs and control cost growth, HnI
introduced a programn definition phase at the beginning of every program both to filter omut
Nadvised programs and provide better estirmites of t'Ve irequired cost and time He also oncouraged
v'alue engirieerfiig and estabiisheo a cost reductlon progr:%m. Tho cost reduction program am'phastzed
contractor competition and was expected to reduce costs by 25%. Because of seemingly excesqlve
cost growth ],I Cosýt-plu3 contracts, McNamara also emphasized incentive contracts arid total packagA
procurement. Finally, to enhance DOD's abIlity to mon.-or the contractors end Sarvices. McNamara
increased dava reporting requirements and Iniroduced should-cost analysis (a DOD cost anafysis to
'~determine how much a programn *should" cost). F-Inally, the Selected Acquisition Reporting System(SAR) was ninrcoduced in 1968. The SARs sommarize cost, schedule, and performancpe data on
major acquizýtion programq. This was originally considered arn Internal management tool.
However, tie SARs also becamnO the formal quarterly program report to Congress. Thus. they serve
a dual role.
2 For a dii.lnof this perio-,d sea Referances 1, 12, 17. 21, 23. 24. 25. 26.
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Dutring 'he 1960s, there was growing di,3sallsfaction with McNamara's approach to Defense
management. The management philosophy was not Ma~ point of contensi'on. In tact, mrost
prortirement reformrs since McNamara havwe adopted a similar managemnent p~iilosophy- The
rontrovnrsy over McNamara's defense management centered on~ lmpiernent~~ifin. McNarniar*, was
criticized for excessive centralization. over-zealatis impleernlration, over-refienc-e on qiiaritiiative
Measure,5. and Inadequate recogilitiOn Of aSyrnrlffltIO Iniformatlori.
Critics felt that most declsions were made at the to ' levols ot 050; by McNamara in
particular. FurthWrmore, they felt that the dscsions were haspd Ia. jcv on quantitative mneasures
developad by the Systems Analyv'is Offic~e and did not reflect the Servces' subloctiva opinions ar-d
cxpertise. The Systorms Analysis Office was also critic~zed ior taking too active a role in the
decision-making process. 'The Offisca was not IIMlt0et' to perferming analysos, it also initiated
!AudleS and made r,3commencIations. FInally, the quantitatlvc measures used 1c, compare alternative
programns were crtticiznd because they essentially treated uncertainty as !r ft could be predicted,
cosied, arid managed. Ever since McNernai a, DOD procurement rpforms have emfphasized
decentintizatfon, Howwver, the emphasis plzced on quantitative measuras Cý p)rogr-iin olutOOMes hRS
rot diminished-
_TLh_02ackwd Era
When SFRCDEF Melvin L-aird r'nd DEPSEQ0EP David Pack~ard took office In 1969. the genersily
acknowiAdged proolams In the Defanse iier.Ao Included: excseaslva cantraizyation;, allegied
inpfficlendieS In th4 ~acqulsft;on process (V , r-omt growth); and a separation between dorition
making authority, reupcrnsiihiliy ficr iipectain nd accountabiiiiv !or the re'sulllný outcomýý
Trhe roesulting symptoms Included cost growth, schedule delays, arid technical performance
TIhor~falls; poorly defiloed poglams; and Increasing mistrust between DOD and the contractors.
Excessive competition was one~ of the most fbequently cited cause for these problems. This
Incfwled comupwitiom between contractors, between the Services. batvyppn the various federal
dpa'rtmcnts, Pnd betwiein defense and other nationial priorities. Competition was seen as driving
rzcntractors to make copt~rnitic projections regarding program costs, schedules, and technical
p,-rfo~mance. Neither tlie Services nor 0OD chillenged these claims because of lnterservice and
Interdeparimental cirnpetificni for federal funds. Other conti iEuting factors fincludod
L~nder-qUalifled p:rogracrn rrinagers. program turbulence, and inadequate testinr, anti Pvaijation
(wriiuti enablf~d f7;ogruns to advance before technical uricertainitios had been adequately rrjsolv(rti).
Lrlrd anid Packard felt the Increased data requirements arid management oversight introduced
hy r~lcNamara had noi resolved the earlier problems or their symptoms. It had simply Incruasred
m.1nigemerit layering, madp tho acquisition process more complex, and separated decision making
authority, resporisib~iity, and accourltabflity. Laird and Packard felt the? appropriate response? was
to decentralize and streamline the acquisition process, Increase program manager tuRlity
(including training, promotion opportunity, ,ind tenure as program mantager), Improvo thp
requirements settrig process (to ensure that programs would be be-tter defined), increase hardware
testing (ermphasizIng pr~ototpes whenever possible). and Improve xw5t estimating procedures.
T'he Packard Inltlatlv-39 were designed to Imnplement this response. These irlitfajives
emnphasized three basic araas- rimproving DOD's ability to monitor both the contractors and
programn managers; Improving program manager quality; and Improving the acquisition p'ocess
and the quality of thto programns themnselves. These rluliaitves were embodied in tern major policy
elpernr'ts, first outlincid by Mr. Packard In a series of memorandums. and speechies (C'.Packard
menomrandlrm of 28 May 1970, 'Policy Guidance on Mlajor Weapoii System Accqu'sillon*') The
policy eleffienis include:
~Fnratscr'sionof this 4rime pe'lod tsee Heferenices 1, G, 7. UJ. 10, 1-3, 20l. 22, 28, 47.
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